


02295 Advanced Topics in Computer Science

Information Flow Control in C using the Decentralized Label Model

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Outline

- Motivation
- Summary of DLM
- DLM applicability to C
- DLM applied to Subset of C
- Proposal for DLM with C pointers
- Future work
- Questions

Motivation

- Security(confidentiality and integrity) through access control models
- Finer-grain control over information dissemination
- Information flow control models
- DLM has been successfully applied to Java (JiF)
- C is widely used, including safety-critical systems
- Industry is into it: Airbus

Summary of DLM

- Environments with decentralized authority and mutual distrust
- Users have full control over information propagation
- Static analysis technique
 - Label data with owner(s)
 - Each owner authorizes his set of allowed reader(s)
 - Labels can change (by add/remove owners/readers) according to strict rules
 - Labels are (mostly) statically checked in similar fashion to normal types
by the compiler

Summary of DLM

Principals and Labels

- **Principal**

- User or authority entity/group
- Organized in hierarchy called principal hierarchy (***acts for***)

- **Label**

- Similar to normal types
- $L = \{o1:r1; o2:r1,r2\}$
- $owners(L) = \{o1,o2\}$
- $readers(L,o1) = \{r1\}$

Summary of DLM

Relabeling Rules: $L_1 \rightarrow L_2$

- **Restriction**

- Adds owners, removes readers or both

$$L_1 \sqsubseteq L_2 \Leftrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{owners}(L_1) \subseteq \text{owners}(L_2) \\ \forall O \in \text{owners}(L_1) : \text{readers}(L_1, O) \supseteq \text{readers}(L_2, O) \end{array}$$

- **Declassification:**

- Adds readers to owner **O**, removes owner **O** itself
- Only if the process **acts for** owner **O**
- ***declassify(exp, L)***

Summary of DLM

Joining Labels: $L_1 \sqcup L_2$

- Values are computed by combining other values
- Labels of those values are joined (combined) to obtain label of the result

$$\begin{aligned} \text{owners}(L_1 \sqcup L_2) &= \text{owners}(L_1) \cup \text{owners}(L_2) \\ \text{readers}(L_1 \sqcup L_2, O) &= \text{readers}(L_1, O) \cap \text{readers}(L_2, O) \end{aligned}$$

- $L_1 \sqcup L_2$ is the least restrictive label of both
- This definition is precise if

$$O \notin \text{owners}(L) \Rightarrow \text{readers}(L, O) = \text{set of all principals}$$

Summary of DLM

Lattice of Labels

- Partial order: restriction operator \sqsubseteq
- Least element: \perp
- Greatest element: \top
- Least upper bound: join operator \sqcup
- Greatest lower bound: meet operator \sqcap

Summary of DLM

More...

- Block labels prevent implicit information flow
 - All variables V_i observed to reach a specific program point are joined together to form the block label: $\underline{B} = \bigsqcup V_i$
- Implicit labels to functions and labels polymorphism
- Generated system of constraints is solved simultaneously
 - Solution found: adherence to flow policy
 - No solution / contradiction: violation of flow policy

DLM Applicability to C

- C pointers
- Weakly-typed C
- Inline assembly
- Pointers to functions

DLM Applied to Subset of C

```

1  int{C  $\sqcup$  d} decrypt(C,d,n){
2      int Msg=1;           //  $\perp \sqsubseteq \underline{Msg}$ 
3      for(i=0, i<d, i++)   //  $L_1 = \underline{i} \sqcup \underline{d}$ 
4          Msg=Msg*C%n;     //  $\underline{Msg} \sqcup \underline{C} \sqcup \underline{n} \sqcup \{rol\} \sqcup L_1 \sqsubseteq \underline{Msg}$ 
5      Msg=Msg%n;          //  $\underline{Msg} \sqcup \underline{n} \sqsubseteq \underline{Msg}$ 
6      if_acts_for(decrypt,rol)
7          return declassify(Msg); //  $\underline{Msg} \sqsubseteq L_d \sqcup \{rol\}, L_d \sqsubseteq \underline{C} \sqcup \underline{d}$ 
8      return 0;           //  $\perp \sqsubseteq \underline{C} \sqcup \underline{d}$ 
9  }

```

$$L_1, \underline{Msg}, \underline{i} = \underline{C} \sqcup \underline{d} \sqcup \{rol\}$$

$$L_d = \underline{C} \sqcup \underline{d}$$

Proposal for DLM with C pointers

- Keep pointers functionality as is
- Do not spoil the advantages of static analysis techniques
- Introduce no/minor changes/additions to the original DLM

Proposal for DLM with C pointers

Variable label and address label

- Variable label becomes $L = \{L_a, L_b\}$
 - L_a is the normal label of the variable
 - L_b is the label of the variable address
- Moreover, we choose to enforce

$$\text{owners}(L_a) \subseteq \text{owners}(L_b)$$

Proposal for DLM with C pointers

Pointer dereference: which variable?

- At compile time, actual value of a pointer dereference is unknown
- Use results of **alias analysis** to limit the possibilities
- Label of a pointer dereference expression should be at least as restrictive as the most restrictive label of all variables in the alias analysis results

$$\mathbf{y} = *z \quad \text{incurs constraint} \quad \bigsqcup_i \underline{x}_i \sqsubseteq \underline{y}$$

Where x_i ranges over alias analysis result of the pointer expression $*z$

Proposal for DLM with C pointers

Pointer dereference: who can do it?

- Pointer dereference is a sensitive operation
- Use results of **alias analysis** to allow a pointer dereference only when all possible owner(s) of variables in the alias analysis results are in the effective authority

$$\text{effective authority} \supseteq \bigcup_i \text{owners}(x_i)$$

where x_i ranges over alias analysis result of the pointer expression

Future Work

- Alias analysis might be invalidated at run-time
- Develop type system for C inline assembly
- Enforcing strong typing on C

Please refer to the paper for list of references

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**Thank you,
Questions**

